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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 15-1816 & 15-2410 
___________ 
 
IBRAHIM ATANDA, 
        Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
          Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A205-671-429) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 28, 2015 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 30, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Ibrahim Atanda, proceeding pro se, petitions for review of two orders issued by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  Atanda’s first petition challenges the BIA’s 
March 17, 2015 decision, which upheld the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
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Atanda’s application for relief from removal.  Atanda’s second petition challenges the 
BIA’s May 15, 2015 decision, which denied his motion to reconsider that earlier order or 
reopen his removal proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny both petitions. 
I. 
 Atanda is a citizen of Nigeria who arrived in the United States in January 2013.  In 
June 2013, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with being removable for 
not possessing valid entry documents when he applied for admission, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and seeking to procure a visa or admission into the United States 
by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  
Atanda, represented by counsel, conceded those charges and applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In 
support of the application, Atanda claimed that he had been mistreated in Nigeria by his 
family on account of his conversion from Islam to Christianity in 2012.1 
 In October 2013, the IJ denied Atanda’s application.  Although the IJ found 
Atanda’s testimony to be credible and corroborated by record evidence, the IJ concluded 
that the application lacked merit.  With respect to Atanda’s asylum claim, the IJ found 
that the alleged events in Nigeria, even when considered cumulatively, did not rise to the 
level of past persecution.  As for Atanda’s fear of future persecution, the IJ found that this 
fear was not objectively reasonable because Atanda had not demonstrated (1) “that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Atanda also alleged that, on one occasion, he was chased and beaten by a group of 
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persecution he fears is at the hands of the government or persons that the government is 
unwilling or unable to control,” (Administrative R. in C.A. No. 15-2410 at 183 
[hereinafter A.R.]), or (2) “that his fear of persecution is countrywide,” (id. at 184).  The 
IJ explained that, because Atanda’s asylum claim failed, his withholding of removal 
claim necessarily failed, too.  Lastly, the IJ determined that the allegations in support of 
Atanda’s CAT claim “do[] not rise to the level of torture,” and that “his harm is not 
instigated by or with the consent or acquiescence of a current public official or persons 
acting in an official capacity.”  (Id. at 188.) 
 Atanda, through counsel, appealed to the BIA.  In February 2014, the BIA upheld 
the IJ’s denial of Atanda’s application and dismissed the appeal.  Atanda then filed a pro 
se petition for review in this Court.  In September 2014, we granted that petition, 
concluding that the BIA had mistakenly applied the “deferential clear error standard in at 
least one, if not two, instances when ruling on Atanda’s appeal,” and that this error was 
not harmless.  Atanda v. Att’y Gen., 579 F. App’x 96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 
[hereinafter Atanda I]; see id. at 99.  Specifically, we explained that the BIA had erred by 
reviewing for clear error the IJ’s determination that Atanda’s fear of future persecution 
was not objectively reasonable.  Id. at 99.  We further explained that the BIA may have 
also erred in exercising clear error review over Atanda’s CAT claim: 
[T]he IJ denied CAT relief for two reasons:  (1) Atanda’s 
allegations did not rise to the level of torture; and (2) the 
alleged harm [was] not instigated by or with the consent or 
                                                                                                                                                  
Muslim youth. 
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acquiescence of a current public official or persons acting in 
an official capacity.  On appeal, the BIA did not make clear 
whether it was upholding the denial of CAT relief based on 
the first reason, the second reason, or both.  If the BIA 
intended to rely on the first reason, it erred by failing to 
review that aspect of the IJ’s decision under a de novo 
standard. 
 
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In light of the 
above, we vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.  Id. at 100.  
In doing so, we explained that the BIA did not need to revisit its decision upholding the 
IJ’s past persecution finding because Atanda had not demonstrated that the record 
compelled disturbing that finding.  Id. at 99. 
 Our mandate in Atanda I issued in November 2014.  Over the next several months, 
there was no activity in Atanda’s case before the BIA.  In March 2015, the New York-
based Legal Aid Society (“LAS”) entered its appearance with the BIA on Atanda’s 
behalf.  Six days later (and before LAS filed anything further), the BIA issued a decision 
that once again dismissed Atanda’s appeal from the IJ’s decision.  The BIA, this time 
applying de novo review, agreed with the IJ that Atanda’s fear of future persecution was 
not objectively reasonable.  In reaching this conclusion, the BIA relied on an excerpt 
from its prior decision, which in turn had relied on the U.S. State Department’s 2012 
International Religious Freedom Report for Nigeria (“the 2012 Report”).  The BIA’s new 
decision also clarified its analysis of Atanda’s CAT claim:   
First, we conclude de novo that [Atanda] has not established 
past torture.  Second, we conclude that the [IJ’s] finding that 
the harm [Atanda] fears will not be instigated by or with the 
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consent or acquiescence of a current public official or person 
acting in an official capacity is not clearly erroneous. 
 
(A.R. at 84-85.)  In support of its conclusion on the CAT claim, the BIA again cited the 
2012 Report. 
 Shortly thereafter, Atanda filed a new pro se petition with this Court, seeking 
review of the BIA’s March 2015 decision.  That petition was assigned C.A. No. 15-1816.  
Around the same time, LAS filed a motion with the BIA on Atanda’s behalf, seeking to 
reconsider the BIA’s March 2015 decision and, in the alternative, reopen his removal 
proceedings.  In support of that motion, Atanda argued that the BIA should have 
considered, sua sponte, the State Department’s 2013 International Religious Freedom 
Report for Nigeria (“the 2013 Report”) — that report was issued in July 2014 and was 
not part of the administrative record — instead of relying on the 2012 Report.  Atanda 
further argued that the 2013 Report, along with “other, more-recent, readily available 
reports from United States government sources,” reflected “deteriorating conditions in 
Nigeria with respect to religious freedom.”  (Id. at 17.)     
 On May 15, 2015, the BIA denied Atanda’s motion.  In rejecting his request to 
reconsider, the BIA explained that an alien bears the burden of demonstrating relief from 
removal, and that the agency “is under no requirement to independently conduct research 
to locate and consider documents outside of the record of proceedings which may pertain 
to a[n] [alien’s] claim.”  (Id. at 3.)  As for Atanda’s request to reopen, the BIA stated that 
reopening was not warranted because his extra-record evidence was not material and did 
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not establish a prima facie case for any relief from removal. 
 Atanda subsequently filed another pro se petition for review, this time challenging 
the BIA’s May 2015 decision.  That petition was assigned C.A. No. 15-2410 and 
consolidated with the petition at C.A. No. 15-1816.  These two petitions are now ripe for 
disposition.2       
II. 
 We begin our review with Atanda’s petition challenging the BIA’s March 2015 
decision upholding the denial of his application for relief from removal.  In support of 
that petition, Atanda does not attack the BIA’s evaluation of the evidence that was in the 
record at that time.3  Instead, he argues that the BIA erred by not considering, sua sponte, 
extra-record evidence (the 2013 Report) before issuing its March 2015 decision. 
 Atanda’s argument is unpersuasive.  He himself bore the burden of establishing 
his eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.  See Toure v. Att’y 
Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2006).  After we remanded his case to the BIA, a 
number of months passed before the BIA issued its new decision.  During that time, 
Atanda could have attempted to supplement the administrative record with the 2013 
Report.  However, he failed to do so.4  To be sure, the BIA may sua sponte take 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction over these two petitions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
3 As a result, he has waived that issue.  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
4 We recognize that Atanda was detained during that time, and that he was proceeding 
pro se until shortly before the BIA issued its March 2015 decision.  That said, it appears 
that Atanda could have filed a pro se motion to supplement the administrative record 
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administrative notice of a country report that is not part of the record.  See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).  But that regulation merely gives the BIA permission to do so, see id., 
and Atanda has not cited any authority that requires the BIA to do so, cf. Meghani v. 
INS, 236 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e find no cases in which we held that the 
BIA is required to sua sponte take administrative notice of the most recent country 
report, and [petitioner] cites no cases holding such.”).  Accordingly, we need not disturb 
the BIA’s March 2015 decision. 
 We now turn to Atanda’s petition challenging the BIA’s May 2015 decision 
denying reconsideration and reopening.  We review that denial for abuse of discretion, 
see Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011), and we review the BIA’s 
factual findings underlying that decision for substantial evidence, see Shardar v. Att’y 
Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under the substantial evidence standard, we 
must upholding the BIA’s findings “unless the evidence not only supports a contrary 
conclusion, but compels it.”  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2001)).       
 We first examine Atanda’s request for reconsideration.  “The BIA has described a 
motion for reconsideration as a ‘request that the Board reexamine its decision in light of 
additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case 
which was overlooked.’”  Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012) 
                                                                                                                                                  
while he was detained.  Furthermore, LAS could have filed a counseled motion to 
supplement the record when it entered its appearance on Atanda’s behalf. 
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(quoting In re Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2002)).  Here, Atanda argues that 
the BIA’s March 2015 decision overlooked the 2013 Report.  But as we explained above, 
that report was not part of the administrative record at that time, and Atanda has not cited 
any authority that required the BIA to consider that extra-record evidence sua sponte.  
Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for 
reconsideration. 
 As for Atanda’s request for reopening, the BIA may deny such a request if the 
agency concludes that “(1) the alien has not established a prima facie case for the relief 
sought; (2) the alien ‘has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence’; or 
(3) in the case of discretionary relief (such as asylum), the alien would not be entitled to 
relief even if the motion was granted.”  Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 
2006) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988)).  “To meet the materiality 
requirement, the [alien] must allege facts that would be sufficient, if proved, to change 
the result of [his] application.”  Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 In this case, the BIA concluded that Atanda’s motion to reopen should be denied 
because, inter alia, his new evidence was not material.  That decision was not an abuse of 
discretion.5  Although Atanda takes issue with the BIA’s finding that the 2013 Report did 
not identify any material changes in Nigeria when compared to the 2012 Report, he has 
                                              
5 In light of this conclusion, we need not review the BIA’s determination that Atanda’s 
motion to reopen also failed to make out a prima facie case for relief from removal.  
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not demonstrated that a review of those reports compels a contrary conclusion.  See 
Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 471.6  Additionally, to the extent that Atanda’s new evidence 
referred to the “growing threat” of the terrorist organization known as Boko Haram, (see 
A.R. at 4), we agree with the BIA that this evidence was not material to Atanda’s case 
because none of that evidence indicates that Boko Haram has made incursions in the 
southern portion of Nigeria (the region from which Atanda hails).7 
 In light of the above, we will deny both of Atanda’s petitions for review. 
                                              
6 The two reports are both at least nine pages long.  In arguing that they are materially 
different from one another, Atanda points to four brief excerpts (none of which is longer 
than two sentences) in which the language of one report is not identical to the other.  We 
have considered these excerpts but we are not persuaded that they compel the conclusion 
that the 2013 Report reflects a material worsening of country conditions in Nigeria.      
7 Atanda claims that the persecution he fears from his family prevents him from safely 
returning to the southern part of Nigeria.  But the IJ and the BIA have already determined 
that those fears are not objectively reasonable, and Atanda has waived his right to 
challenge that determination here.  See supra p.6 & n.3.    
